THE GAME SYSTEMS USED WERE SOLELY BASED ON THE INDIVIDUAL QUALITIES OF THE PLAYERS
— Lucien Gamblin | 22/06/1938 —

Has the World Cup taught us anything about the different methods that current teams from all countries practice?

No, if we stick to the very essence of football, a team sport which is played on immutable rules, according to general principles clearly defined by those who codified the game of the ball — round the British — and which seems to have found its final form after having undergone numerous modifications since the day of its creation.

Yes, if we seek to find the reasons for the victories and defeats of the participants according to the particularities of the game systems used.

THE EXAMPLE OF ITALY.

Let's take the Italian team which brilliantly triumphed over all its adversaries and whose final success is beyond discussion, as it was clear and deserved.

Their defense was very good, but it did not apply a new method, it was mainly due to the decision of the backs, their excellent physical condition, their sense of interception, their mobility, their vigor in intervention and their skill.

But we already knew all this, and we remember that Italy had with Combi, Rosetta and Caligaris, or with Combi, Mascheroni and Allemandi, defensive trios at least as good as the one currently protecting its nets, and which proceeded in the same way.

It is the same with regard to the game of the squadra azzurra half-backs. Since Monti took over from Bernardini as centre-half, Mr. Vittorio Pozzo has always placed wing-halves alongside his pivot whose main qualities are activity, working power and inexhaustible inspiration. Now Andreolo is an exact replica of Monti, and Locatelli and Serantoni, by operating as Bertolini and Ferraris IV. did five years ago, have taught us nothing new.

It is not even the brilliant play of the Italian attack line, made up of two fast wingers and excellent footballers, a centre-forward Piola, who is a pure marvel, and two inside forwards, Meazza and Ferrari, to the means refined by age, but exceptional tacticians, who owe the superb results obtained, more to the adaptation of the qualities of these players than to a method specific to combating the enemy's way, than to a new system of play.

Meazza and Ferrari, strategists of high standing, played, against Hungary, the same football that they would have played four years ago with Orsi on the left wing, Guaita on the right wing and Schiavo in the center. They understood from the first minutes of the match that they had at their disposal the enormous strip of land left free by the Hungarians between their forwards and their halfbacks. They used it remarkably well, of course. But it's been a few years since David Jack and Alec James gave us frequent demonstrations of this way of operating in the Arsenal team; so nothing new yet on this point.

WHERE THE MIND COMES INTO PLAY.

But, on the other hand, it seems that the Italian players gave the impression of knowing better than before, and above all more quickly, how to get the maximum out of themselves and impose their presence on their opponents.

There were not many tests of the tactics to be used. In a few minutes the case was heard. Since the Hungarians only marked the Italian wingers from afar, it was through them that the opposing defence had to be overrun, leaving Piola to keep the centre-half and the Magyar backs in a constant situation of danger by its pointed position. This is already déjà vu, and if Colaussi and Biavati had not been much faster than their opponents, if Piola had not been an exceptional footballer, it is almost certain that the work of Meazza and Ferrari would not have been as productive.